Introduction
For government to effectively govern, it needs instruments through which it can pursue public purposes and defined objectives. 1 Generally, laws (legislation/by-laws) and policies have been identified, inter alia, as some of the types of instruments used by government to govern.
2 For example, the Local Government: Municipal
System Act 3 provides that in governing a municipality a municipal council could exercise its executive and legislative authority by developing and adopting policies. 4 In general, governance instruments (including policies) are used to allocate resources, to regulate people's behaviour (inter alia by creating incentives, rights and duties) and to communicate government's understanding of society's collective problems and its vision for the future to the public. 5 Despite the importance of policies as governance instruments, 6 there seems to be uncertainty on the status literature. 19 Political policies can be represented as a plan of action adopted by a political party or the government in power and presented to the electorate/public as a series of value preferences which it seeks to implement upon election/re-election.
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Such policies cannot be enforced irrespective of their content and at best remain the party's/government's vision for the future. 21 This is the common view in academic literature, which draws largely from the manner in which public policy developed as a branch of public administration in the United States. 22 According to Cloete, such policies could be seen as election slogans or convenient propaganda documents which may only be better formulated when tabled in Parliament as a Bill. 23 From the above explanation, it seems that political policies can be further sub-divided into ''government'' policies and ''party'' policies. Cloete indicates that when a political party decides to take part in an election, it examines community life and ''on the basis of its findings and the political beliefs of its members, it declares its stand on various issues''. 24 This initial declaration is purely a ''party policy'' and reflects the beliefs of members of that political party. 25 On the other hand, a government can transform a ''party policy'' into a ''government'' policy, outlining the government's vision for the country. 26 Although government policies still adhere to party philosophy, they generally aim at promoting the collective welfare of society as a whole. 27 Good examples of ''political'' policies include the ANC Freedom Charter, 30 and all ''White Papers''.
A second type of policy is referred to as ''executive policy''. 31 When an elected government translates a political policy into legislation, it then becomes the responsibility of ''political executive institutions'' and ''executive office-bearers'' to take the initiative to implement the legislation. 32 Political executive institutions include "the Cabinet, Provincial Executive Councils and the executive mayor/executive committee of a municipal council". 33 On the other hand, "executive office-bearers" include ministers and deputy ministers. 34 It is the responsibility of executive office-bearers such as ministers to transform legislation into a form that is passed unto various government departments for implementation. 35 This becomes relevant in instances where legislation explicitly requires a member of the executive arm of government such as a cabinet minister to adopt specific policies in order to
give effect to specific legislative provisions. 36 In other instances, legislation may require that the executive give meaning to some provisions through interpreting and delimiting the scope of application. 37 Hattingh argues that "executive" policies are therefore implementable and enforceable. 38 Such "executive" policies should complement, but ''cannot override, amend or be in conflict with" legislation. 39 It is 29 See White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994) (GN 353 in GG 16085 of 23 November 1994 also important to note that enforceable "executive" policies can also emanate from negotiations between the executive (especially in municipalities) and the public (community residents) with regard to the content of a socio-economic right that the executive seeks to provide. 40 Examples of "executive" policies in South Africa include national and municipal indigent policies which specifically give effect to the socio- Secondly, each municipality is obliged to sustainably manage a basic water supply facility so as to ensure that water supply is available for at least 350 days per year and not interrupted for more than 48 consecutive hours per incident and to communicate to the public the importance of good water use, hygiene and related practices. This is referred to as a basic water supply service. 47 Although this requirement can be rightly seen as a positive obligation imposed on local government to take action that will ensure and sustain access to the right of access to sufficient water, it can also be seen as imposing a negative obligation on municipalities to refrain from actions that will impede the enjoyment of the right of access to water.
Thirdly, each municipality is obliged to provide indigent households with a basic sanitation facility which is safe, reliable, private, protected from the weather and ventilated and which keeps smells to the minimum. 48 In addition, the basic sanitation facility should be easy to keep clean, and should minimise the risks of the spread of sanitation-related diseases by facilitating the proper treatment and/or removal of human waste and wastewater in a manner that is environmentally asserted, "administration is the most obvious part of government; it is government in action, it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government".
68
Due to the increasing delegation of regulatory powers to the executive, the executive and administrative arm of government has witnessed remarkable growth in importance, performing most of the "minor" legislative functions of parliament.
69
Although this may not sit well with the traditional application of the doctrine of the separation of powers, this generally indicates that the executive performs both administrative and legislative functions. 
Socio-economic rights in the Constitution
The socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitutional Court used existing constitutional and legislative provisions that oblige local government to provide basic services to community residents to establish a (constitutional) right to electricity. 78 The reasoning of the Court in Joseph could also be interpreted to establish a (constitutional) right to sanitation, 79 independent of other related but self-standing rights. 80 However, in Nokotyana, the Constitutional Court declined to make a finding on the applicant's submission that the right to sanitation is integral to the constitutional right of access to adequate housing.
81
evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions".
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Section 27 of the Constitution provides that: "(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-(a)
healthcare services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment".
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Section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that: "Everyone has the right -to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible".
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Section 25(5) of the Constitution provides that: "The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis".
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Section 24 of the Constitution provides that: "Everyone has the right -(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well being; and (b) to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development".
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As will become evident in the discussion that follows, the socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution are abstract entitlements which become meaningful entitlements only when government adopts legislation, policies, plans and programmes to give effect to them. 82 Without these processes of translation, the socio-economic rights remain vague guarantees.
The duty to take "reasonable legislative and other measures"
The abstract nature of socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitution requires that they should be translated into concrete enforceable legal rights. 83 In addition to the duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfill socio-economic rights, 84 the Constitution imposes an obligation on the government to adopt "reasonable legislative and other measures" to give effect to the rights guaranteed inter alia in sections 24, 25(5), 26(1) and 27(1). Read jointly, these provisions create "an openended" duty with significant initiative left in the hands of public authorities to realise socio-economic rights. 85 The task to concretise abstract constitutional guarantees into concrete entitlements is supposed to be executed broadly by the legislature, the executive and state administration, and their respective organs of state, through various processes. 86 In terms of local government, for example, this obligation entails that, in addition to by-laws, local government should adopt policies, plans, programmes and strategies that would contribute to the realisation of socio- Brand "Introduction to Socio-economic Rights" 12; Pieterse 2010 Law, Democracy and Development 231-232. In reflecting on the limits of socio-economic rights litigation in realising the transformative potential of the Constitution, Liebenberg recognises the primary duty of the legislature and the executive to adopt and implement measures that will lead to the realisation of socio-economic rights with courts largely playing an interpretative but transformative role. She argues that: "An approach premised on the courts possessing all the answers on how best to realise socio-economic rights, can also have negative repercussions for democratic transformation. The likely effect is to induce legislative and executive lethargy, and an abdication of the primary role of these branches under the Constitution to give effect to socio-economic rights guaranteed by formulating and implementing social legislation and programmes through In addition to the above requirements, the Constitutional Court has indicated that reasonable measures directed towards realising socio-economic rights must take into consideration the objectives of the Constitution, the multi-dimensional nature and prevalence of poverty in South Africa and the capacity of institutions responsible for implementing social legislation and policies. 115 The legislation and policies adopted to
give effect to socio-economic rights must be balanced and flexible and must pay attention to short-, medium-and long-term needs. To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving the realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test of reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a statistical advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the test.
In view of the above, and by way of analogy, any challenge based on sections 24(b), 25(5), 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution in which it is argued that the state failed to meet the positive obligations imposed on it by these constitutional provisions, courts will have to simply decide if the legislative and other measures adopted are give effect to socio-economic rights is informed by the Constitution. What must be stressed from the Court's jurisprudence for the purpose of our discussion is the reality that the "contours and content" of the measures adopted to give effect to socio-economic rights are primarily a matter for the legislature and the executive, subject to the standard of reasonableness. 123 In addition, the criteria used by the
Constitutional Court to determine the reasonableness of measures implemented to
give effect to socio-economic rights are non-exhaustive. 
Delegation of legislative powers to the executive in South Africa
In South Africa, the legislative authority of the national sphere of government is vested in Parliament as set out in section 44 of the Constitution. 125 In terms of the provincial sphere of government, the legislative authority is vested in provincial Regulations are a category of subordinate legislation framed and implemented by a functionary or body other than the legislature for the purpose of implementing valid legislation. Such functionaries are usually members of the executive branch of government, but not invariably so. A legislature has the power to delegate the powers to make regulations to functionaries when such regulations are necessary to supplement the primary legislation. Ordinarily the functionary will be the President or the Premier or the member of the executive responsible for the implementation of the law… The factors relevant to a consideration of whether the delegation of law-making power is appropriate are many. They include the nature and ambit of the delegation, the identity of the person or institution to whom the power is delegated, and the subject matter of the delegated power.
Although the power to delegate law-making functions to the executive branch of government raises difficult questions relating to the traditional application of the Another important factor which must be taken into consideration is the nature and extent of the delegation. 141 The Court has indicated that the primary reason for delegation is to ensure that the legislature is not overwhelmed by the need to determine minor regulatory details. Delegation therefore relieves the legislature from dealing with detailed provisions that are often required for the purpose of implementing and regulating laws. 142 Thus, the legislature may delegate subordinate regulatory authority to the executive but may not assign plenary legislative power to the executive. 143 The legislature can therefore delegate "the determination of mere minor detail" to the executive but cannot "shift" all its law-making power to the executive. 144 According to the Court, the legislature "may not ordinarily delegate its essential legislative functions" to the executive in a constitutional democracy. 145 This limitation is informed by the delegation doctrine, which is informed by the doctrine of the separation of powers. The delegation doctrine requires that law-making, which is a proper function of the legislature, "should not be delegated excessively to the executive branch of government". 146 In addition, this restraint is intended to balance "the need for efficiency in government against the need to avoid subverting the constitutional legislative framework". 147 It is acknowledged that the potential of such transfer does not sit easily with the traditional notions of the doctrine of the separation of powers. has the force of law and the main question which should be addressed is whether there is constitutional or legislative authority to delegate the power in question to the executive (the minister, for example). 149 As Bishop and Raboshakga put it, the discretion of the executive to exercise sub-regulatory authority or draft laws remains valid as long as ''it does not alter the text of the legislation" and "there is no specific constitutional mandate for the legislature to act' '. 150 This means that the executive has discretion on how it exercises its sub-regulatory power provided such power and discretion does not conflict with the delegating legislation or the Constitution. There is therefore no prescribed manner in which the executive should exercise delegated regulatory authority except that it should comply with principles of delegating legislation and the Constitution. The subsequent paragraphs show that this discretion enables ministers to exercise sub-regulatory authority in the form of ''regulations'', ''strategies'', ''policies'', ''notices'' and even ''lists''.
In South Africa, original legislation that seeks to give effect to socio-economic rights is replete with provisions delegating sub-regulatory authority to the executive. In the area of social assistance, for example, section 5 (1) Section 56 of NEMBA provides that: "56(1) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette publish a list of -(a) Critically endangered species, being any indigenous species facing an extremely high risk of extinction in the wild in the immediate future; (b) endangered species, being any indigenous species facing a high risk of extinction in the wild in the near future, although they are not a critically endangered species; (c) vulnerable species, being indigenous species facing an extreme risk of extinction in the wild in the medium term future, although they are not a critically endangered species; and (d) protected species, being of any species which are of such high conservation value or national protection, although they are not listed in terms of paragraph standards. 160 These provisions amount to a delegation of the functions of the legislature to the executive and illustrate the important role that must be played by the executive in order to ensure that socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitution can be translated into reality. The word 'policy' is inherently vague and may bear different meanings. It appears to me to serve little purpose to quote dictionaries defining the word. To draw the distinction between what is policy and what is not with reference to specificity is, in my view, not always very helpful or necessarily correct. For example, a decision that children below the age of six are ineligible for admission to a school, can fairly be called a "policy" and merely because the age is fixed does not make it less of a policy than a decision that young children are ineligible, even though the word "young" has a measure of elasticity in it. Any course or program of action adopted by a government may consist of general or specific provisions. Because of this I do not consider it prudent to define the word either in general or in the context of the Act. I prefer to begin by stating the obvious, namely that laws, regulations and rules are legislative instruments whereas policy determinations are not. As a matter of sound government, in order to bind the public, policy should normally be reflected in such instruments. Policy determinations cannot override, amend or be in conflict with laws (including subordinate legislation). Otherwise the separation between legislature and executive will disappear.
From the above extract, it clear that the mere fact that an instrument is referred to as a policy, code or strategy does not clearly determine its legal consequences.
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This potentially increases uncertainty in governance. According to Steytler, the most important factor to be taken into consideration in determining the legislative effect of a policy, code or strategy is the legislative intent of the executive. 165 For example, the delegated legislative authority to the Minister of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs to prescribe minimum standards, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, for the provision of free basic services to poor households finds expression in the form of policy -indigent policies. 166 In addition, a national water resource strategy developed by the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs pursuant to Chapter 2 of the National Water Act 167 is intended to be "binding on all authorities and institutions exercising powers or performing duties under this Act".
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It is interesting to note that according to section 6(1)(b)(ii) of the National Water Act, the content of the national water resource strategy must set out international rights and obligations. It is obvious that if rights and obligations are spelt out in a strategy, that strategy can be enforceable to the extent that it creates rights and duties. Brand has indicated in the context of socio-economic rights jurisprudence that policies aimed at giving effect to socio-economic rights inter alia define the obligations of the executive arms of government in relation to those rights and that they are enforceable to the extent that such policies create concrete rights or entitlements.
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It is now established that although the Constitution is silent on Parliament's powers to delegate law-making functions to the executive, this is (to an extent) 164 Steytler 2011 SAPL 488-489. 165 Steytler 2011 SAPL 488-489. 166 See National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) . constitutionally permissible for the purposes of good governance. 170 However, there is no prescribed manner in which the executive must exercise such powers. This allows the executive discretion to decide on how it will exercise delegated legislative authority. It appears that when the executive exercises delegated legislative authority in the form of policies, strategies or notices, it acts in accordance with the constitutional discretion it enjoys. The nomenclature of the instrument used by the executive when it exercises delegated legislative powers should therefore not automatically determine the legal effect thereof. If exercised in accordance with the Constitution and delegating legislation in the form of a policy, such a policy should be classified as an executive policy as now established by South African public administration experts.
Based on the preceding paragraphs, it can be said that executive policies which seek to realise socio-economic rights can be a direct response to the positive duties imposed on the executive arm of government to adopt measures to give effect to socio-economic rights or to give effect to the provisions of original legislation in the field of socio-economic rights. Due to the fact that executive policies derive their legal validity from the Constitution or delegated legislation, they should be enforceable in a court. The Constitutional Court has established that where a policy gives effect to constitutional socio-economic rights, individuals may challenge the policy against constitutional norms. 171 However, the claims of such individuals must be clearly formulated as a constitutional challenge against the policy and not a direct claim in terms of the Constitution. applicants (including a prison doctor for the second applicant) through prescription, they had given concrete form to the constitutional right of prisoners to adequate medical treatment which it was prepared to uphold. 183 The court ordered that antiretroviral treatment should be extended to the first and second applicant because they were entitled to receive it on prescribed medical grounds. 184 What is important to note for current purposes is that in the absence of a challenge on constitutional compliance, the court was willing to apply to prisoners the provincial hospital policy on the treatment of members of the public infected with AIDS.
In Dudley Lee Mazibuko; Nokotyana; and Dudley Lee. In addition, it argued that where executive policies are adopted pursuant to delegated legislative authority, they are enforceable to the extent that they are consistent with relevant delegating legislation and the Constitution. It has been established through a number of Constitutional Court cases that although the Constitution does not expressly provide for the legislature to delegate law-making powers to the executive, it is permissible for purposes of good governance for original legislation to delegate regulatory powers to the executive:
Constitutionality of the Mpumalanga Petitions Bill; Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature; and Justice Alliance. In addition, it has been established that the executive often has discretion on how it exercises delegated law-making powers.
This could take the form of a regulation, policy, code or strategy.
This author hopes that the above exposition will help in clarifying the confusion surrounding the legal status and possible basis for the enforcement of executive policies that give effect to socio-economic rights in South Africa.
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Akani Garden Route ( This article argues that these duties amount to a constitutional delegation of authority to the legislative and executive branches of government to concretise socio-economic rights. In addition, this article demonstrates that where "executive" policies give effect to socio-economic rights pursuant to powers delegated by enabling provisions in original legislation that covers the field of socio-economic rights, such policies may be perceived to have the force of law, thereby providing a legal basis for their judicial enforcement. 
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